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Episodic memory refers to a complex and multifaceted process which enables the retrieval
of richly detailed evocative memories from the past. In contrast, semantic memory is
conceptualized as the retrieval of general conceptual knowledge divested of a specific spa-
tiotemporal context.The neural substrates of the episodic and semantic memory systems
have been dissociated in healthy individuals during functional imaging studies, and in clinical
cohorts, leading to the prevailing view that episodic and semantic memory represent func-
tionally distinct systems subtended by discrete neurobiological substrates. Importantly,
however, converging evidence focusing on widespread neural networks now points to sig-
nificant overlap between those regions essential for retrieval of autobiographical memories,
episodic learning, and semantic processing. Here we review recent advances in episodic
memory research focusing on neurodegenerative populations which has proved revelatory
for our understanding of the complex interplay between episodic and semantic memory.
Whereas episodic memory research has traditionally focused on retrieval of autobiographi-
cal events from the past, we also include evidence from the recent paradigm shift in which
episodic memory is viewed as an adaptive and constructive process which facilitates the
imagining of possible events in the future. We examine the available evidence which con-
verges to highlight the pivotal role of semantic memory in providing schemas and meaning
whether one is engaged in autobiographical retrieval for the past, or indeed, is endeavoring
to construct a plausible scenario of an event in the future. It therefore seems plausible to
contend that semantic processing may underlie most, if not all, forms of episodic memory,
irrespective of temporal condition.
Keywords: semantic dementia, autobiographical memory, future thinking, Alzheimer’s disease, episodic memory,
anterior temporal lobes, semantic memory
INTRODUCTION
One of the most fascinating aspects of human cognition is our abil-
ity to withdraw from the current moment and to mentally trans-
port ourselves to another time, place, or perspective. Collectively,
the abilities to remember the past via episodic autobiographical
memory (ABM), or to imagine possible future events, represent
important expressions of the human memory system (Tulving,
2002), potentially conferring a significant adaptive advantage in
planning for the future (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Klein,
2013). In recent years, episodic memory has been reconceptual-
ized as not only the capacity for retrieval from our personal past,
but also encompassing the ability to imagine and envisage possible
future scenarios, leading to a constructivist view on how humans
might achieve such sophisticated acts of cognition (Hassabis and
Maguire, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007a). Neuroimaging stud-
ies have uncovered a widespread “core” network which subtends
the successful retrieval of autobiographical memories from our
past (Maguire, 2001; Svoboda et al., 2006; Cabeza and St. Jacques,
2007; Schacter et al., 2007). Importantly, this core network includes
frontal and medial temporal regions, notably the hippocampus,
lateral temporal, sensory association cortices, and more posterior
parietal regions (Spreng et al., 2009), reflecting the multifaceted
nature of this type of memory (see Figure 1). While considerable
variation exists in the classification of episodic memory, in this
article, we refer to the contents of episodic memory as “remem-
bered experiences,” or ABM (see Tulving and Szpunar, 2009). As
will become evident, however, the contents of episodic memory
invariably involve semantic representations.
In contrast to the largely evocative, spatiotemporally specific,
and often emotionally charged, instances of episodic memo-
ries from the past sits the repository of all acquired atemporal
knowledge of the world, semantic memory. Traditionally, the
episodic/semantic distinction has served as a useful heuristic
within the neuropsychological literature (Greenberg and Verfael-
lie, 2010), underscoring the importance of the medial temporal
lobes, specifically the hippocampus, in the encoding and retrieval
of episodic memories in contrast with the centrality of the ante-
rior temporal lobes for the retrieval of semantic information.
Similar to episodic memory, semantic memory is viewed as essen-
tial for many aspects of cognition, including language, reasoning,
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FIGURE 1 | Component structures of the core memory network consistently activated during autobiographical retrieval of the past, and constructive
simulation of the future. Notably, the lateral temporal cortex is implicated across past and future contexts, highlighting the central role for semantic memory
in past and future oriented thought. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd., Schacter et al. (2007). Copyright (2007).
planning, problem-solving, and social interaction (Binder et al.,
2009). In support of this position, neuroimaging studies have
demonstrated significant activation in semantic processing regions
in healthy individuals across a wide variety of cognitive abilities
including distinguishing real from fictitious scenarios (Abraham
et al., 2008a), positive counterfactual thinking (Van Hoeck et al.,
in press), as well as engaging in processes relevant for creativity
(Vartanian, 2012). In contrast to the spatiotemporal specificity of
episodic memory, semantic memory is derived from the abstrac-
tion of content from experiences, which is represented using
modality-specific simulations whereby information relevant to a
specific mode of experience is processed within the corresponding
sensory, motor, or affective system (Binder and Desai, 2011). These
representations are processed, therefore, in high level supramodal
convergence zones in the brain including the inferior parietal cor-
tex, the middle and inferior temporal gyri, and anterior portions
of the fusiform gyrus (Patterson et al., 2007; Binder et al., 2009;
Binder and Desai, 2011). Importantly, the semantic system recently
identified in a meta-analysis of 120 functional neuroimaging stud-
ies exhibits striking overlap to the large-scale core ABM network
(Maguire, 2001; Svoboda et al., 2006; Binder et al., 2009) prompt-
ing the observation that autobiographical memories necessarily
contain a high level of semantic concepts (Binder et al., 2009), and
that, by its nature, semantic representations are essential for a host
of complex cognitive functions including remembering the past
and imaging the future (Binder and Desai, 2011). These recent pro-
posals resonate with mounting evidence from the neuroimaging
literature demonstrating considerable overlap between episodic
and semantic memory systems and the unclear boundaries that
exist between these forms of memory (Burianova et al., 2010).
With the advent of sophisticated neuroimaging techniques,
we have witnessed a shift in perspective from studying specific
brain structures in isolation to the consideration of carefully
orchestrated neural networks. Converging evidence now points
to the role of large-scale neural networks in subtending complex
cognitive processes, and the intriguing possibility that semantic
processing may play a central role in all aspects of internal
mentation.
THE STUDY OF NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS
Neurodegenerative disorders offer a compelling view of the cog-
nitive architecture of the brain when specific neural systems break
down in a coordinated fashion (Irish et al., 2012c). In this review,
we will focus on Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and semantic demen-
tia (SD) as lesion models for episodic and semantic memory
processes, respectively, to demonstrate how these dementia syn-
dromes illuminate our understanding of the complexity of the
episodic memory system, and crucially, how episodic and seman-
tic memory invariably interact during complex forms of past and
future oriented thought.
Alzheimer’s disease has long been heralded as a suitable lesion
model for episodic memory processes, in light of the characteris-
tic medial temporal lobe neural degeneration evident from a very
early stage in the pathological process (Butters et al., 1987; Braak
and Braak, 1991). Recent studies point to the preferential accu-
mulation of amyloid deposits in specific nodes of the core ABM
network in AD, most notably the posterior cingulate cortex and
the anteromedial prefrontal cortex (Buckner et al., 2008). Clin-
ically, AD patients typically present with an amnestic profile in
which anterograde episodic memory difficulties concerning the
encoding and retrieval of recent events are prominent (de Toledo-
Morrell et al., 2000; McKhann et al., 2011). This disruption to
episodic memory emerges as a consequence of the neuropatho-
logical process (neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid deposition),
which affects the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus of the medial
temporal lobes, and spreads to the neocortex (Ewers et al., 2011;
Sperling et al., 2011). Importantly, such episodic memory deficits
occur in the context of a relative sparing of semantic processing in
the early stages of the disease (see Table 1).
The neurodegenerative disorder of SD represents the other side
of the coin, in that the hallmark clinical feature of this disease
concerns the progressive and amodal loss of semantic or general
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Table 1 | Clinical characteristics of semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s
disease.
Semantic
dementia (SD)
Alzheimer’s
disease (AD)
Predominant
brain atrophy
Lateral temporal
Left>Right
Medial temporal
Bilateral
Cognitiona
Executive
function
Intact + – ++
Orientation Intact ++
Recent episodic
memory
Intactb +++
Remote episodic
memory
+++ +
Semantic
knowledge
+++ ±
Word
comprehension
+++ ±
aFunctions are relatively intact in the early stages of the disease; bcontingent on
the nature of test materials used; +, mild deficits; ++, moderate deficits; +++,
severe deficits; ±, variable deficits.
conceptual knowledge of the world (Hodges and Patterson, 2007).
This loss of world knowledge occurs irrespective of modality and
is theoretically attributable to the deterioration of a central amodal
semantic hub (Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007; but, see
Mesulam et al., 2013). On a neural level, SD is characterized
by the progressive degeneration of the anterior temporal lobes
(Hodges and Patterson, 2007), most severe on the ventral sur-
face and including the perirhinal cortex, anterior fusiform gyrus
(Whitwell et al., 2005; Mion et al., 2010), and typically lateralized to
the left more than the right hemisphere. Importantly, volumetric
MRI studies have confirmed that the degree of hippocampal atro-
phy in SD is equivalent, or greater, to that seen in disease-matched
cases of AD, albeit in the context of much more severe temporal
lobe atrophy (Chan et al., 2001; Galton et al., 2001). Of paramount
importance in the current context, however, is the observation that
despite profound semantic deficits, SD patients nevertheless dis-
play otherwise relatively preserved cognitive functions, including
retrieval of recent episodic information, particularly when non-
verbal tasks are employed (see Table 1; Bozeat et al., 2000; Crutch
and Warrington, 2002; Hodges and Patterson, 2007).
In summary, the neurodegenerative disorders of AD and SD
offer a unique opportunity to disentangle the interaction between
the episodic and semantic memory systems. A theoretically impor-
tant distinction is evident: while in AD we see the loss of episodic
memory in the context of medial temporal lobe degeneration and
relative preservation of semantic knowledge, in SD, the amodal
deterioration of semantic memory occurs in the context of rel-
atively preserved recent episodic memory. A range of interde-
pendencies between episodic and semantic memory have recently
been expounded (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010). Here, however,
we will constrain our focus to explore how these dementia syn-
dromes inform our understanding of two putative expressions of
the episodic memory system, namely autobiographical retrieval of
the past, and simulation of the future.
REMEMBERING THE PAST – AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Perhaps the most important advances in understanding the inter-
play between episodic and semantic elements stem from the
domain of ABM. The recollection of personal past memories
from across our subjective timeline represents a powerful expres-
sion of the episodic memory system, requiring the retrieval of
sensory-perceptual details, and emotional connotations, inte-
grated within a specific spatiotemporal and personally relevant
framework (Conway et al., 2004). Unsurprisingly, this complex
endeavor is subtended by a distributed neural network involv-
ing the medial temporal lobes including the hippocampus and
parahippocampal gyrus, the frontal poles, and more posterior
regions including the posterior cingulate and parietal cortices, as
well as the lateral temporal cortices (Maguire, 2001; Addis et al.,
2004; Svoboda et al., 2006). It is noteworthy that across studies of
ABM retrieval, activation of the lateral temporal cortices, regions
known to be essential for semantic memory (Mion et al., 2010), is
reliably observed (Spreng et al., 2009), suggesting a fundamental
role for semantic processing underlying all forms of episodic past
retrieval (see Figure 1).
PRESERVATION OF REMOTE ABMs IN ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
The main structures implicated in ABM retrieval are those
regions harboring significant atrophy in AD and SD. Importantly,
our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms of ABM
retrieval has been advanced from studying how the characteris-
tic patterns of atrophy in AD and SD impact on the capacity for
ABM retrieval. Little doubt exists regarding the prominent deficits
in ABM typically seen in AD from early in the disease course.
Irrespective of measure used, patients with AD demonstrate strik-
ing impairments, particularly on event or episodic subscales of
these measures, in contrast with a relative preservation of per-
sonal semantics, at least in the early stages of the disease (Barnabe
et al., 2012). A central debate in the ABM literature concerns the
temporal profile of the episodic ABM deficit in AD, and specifi-
cally whether it conforms to Ribot’s law (Ribot, 1881), in which
memories from more distant time periods appear relatively intact.
A number of early studies of ABM have demonstrated a dispro-
portionate impairment of recent compared to remote episodic
memories in AD (Kopelman et al., 1989; Greene et al., 1995; Gra-
ham and Hodges, 1997; Eustache et al., 2004; Irish et al., 2006,
2011b; Leyhe et al., 2009), which in turn has been interpreted
in favor of a time-limited role of the hippocampus in long-term
retrieval (Squire and Alvarez, 1995). The preservation of remote
memories in AD, however, is of interest if we consider that older
memories are more likely to undergo a process of semanticization
(Cermak, 1984), leading to overgeneral memories that are divested
of rich episodic re-experiencing (Irish et al., 2008, 2011b). The
relative sparing of the lateral temporal cortices, and a reasonably
intact capacity for reminiscence in remote epochs of one’s life, in
the early stages of AD accords with observations of reliance on gist
memory in this syndrome (Gallo et al., 2006) and suggests that
patients may overly depend on semantic representations of for-
merly episodic events. Similarly,patients with AD have been shown
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to lose access to sensory-perceptual details and appear particularly
deficient in evoking specific self-referential visual imagery during
ABM retrieval (Irish et al., 2011b). This loss of visual imagery may
preclude the triggering of an emotional response (Kosslyn et al.,
2001) and disrupts the overall re-experiencing of the retrieved
event. A recent study has demonstrated that the capacity to gen-
erate complex visual imagery is compromised in AD, with the
proposal that such deficits may impinge upon the envisaging of
oneself across past and future contexts (Hussey et al., 2012). Thus,
for AD patients, the retrieval of a past event occurs in the absence
of vivid visual imagery, producing overgeneral and depersonalized
or semanticized accounts of the formerly evocative event. These
categories of events can be subsumed under Neisser’s concept of
“repisodes” (Neisser, 1981), Barsalou’s “extended events” (Barsa-
lou, 1988), or Conway’s view of “general events” within the ABM
system (Conway, 2001; Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010). While
Irish et al. (2011b) reported a loss of self-referential visual imagery
during retrieval of specific episodic autobiographical memories,
the ability of AD patients to visualize repeated or abstracted expe-
riences remains to be established. This represents an interesting,
but underexplored area of research that has obvious relevance for
the constructs under consideration.
Recent studies, including a large study from our group, have
failed to demonstrate temporal gradients during ABM retrieval in
AD (Piolino et al., 2003; Irish et al., 2011a). Such conflicting results
may reflect differences in probing and scoring of ABMs across
experimental protocols (Barnabe et al., 2012). Importantly, the
separation of internal “episodic,” from external, or non-episodic,
details using the Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine et al.,
2002) in the Irish et al. (2011a) study, serves to constrain the focus
to purely episodic recall in AD. While this approach has proved
extremely useful for studying strictly episodic components of ABM
narratives, the resultant flat profiles in AD are also revelatory in
this context. The disappearance of temporal gradients during ABM
retrieval, following the parsing of semantic from episodic details,
suggests that semantic knowledge represents a sizeable proportion
of remote memory content in AD. This observation meshes well
with the view that the episodic and semantic memory systems are
invariably interlinked (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010), and that
episodic memory requires binding of contextual elements within
existing frameworks of conceptual knowledge (Reder et al., 2009).
The characteristic loss of episodic memory, thus prompts the AD
patient to sample intact semantic and gist-based knowledge to
guide their retrieval effort, as this approach represents the most
accessible and efficient route of access (Greenberg and Verfaellie,
2010; Szpunar, 2010a).
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY RETRIEVAL IN SEMANTIC
DEMENTIA
The investigation of profiles of ABM in SD has elucidated the
impact of progressive semantic memory deterioration on episodic
memory retrieval. Studies of ABM in SD have yielded inconsistent
results, with most pointing to the converse profile to that charac-
teristically seen in AD, namely a reverse temporal gradient, or more
accurately, a step function (Hodges and Graham, 2001). The step
function describes the observation of relatively preserved recent
period retrieval in contrast with impairments in the recollection
of memories from more remote epochs (Graham and Hodges,
1997; Nestor et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2003; Hou et al., 2005;
Matuszewski et al., 2009; Irish et al., 2011a; see Figure 2). The pre-
cise underpinnings of relatively intact recent period retrieval in
SD remain contentious. This effect has been interpreted as reflect-
ing preserved anterograde processes and encoding and retrieval
mechanisms (Adlam et al., 2009; Matuszewski et al., 2009). Fur-
ther, it has been suggested that recent memories encompass more
sensory-perceptual elements rather than overgeneral or semanti-
cized information (Hodges and Graham, 2001; Nestor et al., 2002),
with SD patients relying on such perceptual features for recent
retrieval. The step function profiles of ABM in SD offer further
insights into the possible semanticization of episodic memories
with repeated rehearsal and the passing of time. The repeated
recollection and rehearsal of remote memories allows for the
abstraction of the gist of the episode without its accompanying
sensory-perceptual details (Rosenbaum et al., 2001), resulting in a
largely schematic account of the formerly evocative event. By this
view, remote memory deficits in SD reflect a loss of semantic infor-
mation that is integral to the memory trace (Westmacott et al.,
2001). Interestingly, McKinnon et al. (2008) reported an eleva-
tion of external (non-episodic) details in concert with a reduction
in internal (episodic) details during ABM retrieval in SD. This
effect was interpreted as reflecting a relative sparing of generic
autobiographical information as well as the provision of tangen-
tial details. Thus, while the deterioration of semantic knowledge
impinges on the capacity for successful ABM retrieval in SD,
semantic elements relevant to the retrieved event are often present
within the patients’ABM narratives. Notably, the ability to retrieve
personal semantic and overgeneral autobiographical information
from their past appears relatively preserved in SD (Greenberg and
Verfaellie, 2010).
It should be noted, however, that a number of studies have failed
to replicate the step function during ABM retrieval in SD (Westma-
cott et al., 2001; Moss et al., 2003; McKinnon et al., 2006; Maguire
et al., 2010a). Such inconsistencies in the literature may stem from
the methods used to probe ABM retrieval. It is notable that these
FIGURE 2 | Differential impairment of remote versus recent
autobiographical memory in semantic dementia compared to healthy
controls during free recall on the Autobiographical Interview (AI). Error
bars represent standard error of the mean. **P <0.0001; n/s, not
significant. Data adapted from Irish et al. (2011a).
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studies all used non-verbal stimuli, such as family photographs, to
elicit ABMs. Importantly, the use of non-verbal stimuli in SD tends
to produce a flat profile, with recent and remote memories recalled
equally well (Westmacott et al., 2001; Moss et al., 2003; Maguire
et al., 2010a; Greenberg et al., 2011). This finding resonates with
the proposal that SD patients may harness perceptual features of
such visual cues to bypass their profound verbal and language
impairments, enabling them to access sensory-perceptual details
at a higher level in the ABM system (Conway, 2001; Nestor et al.,
2002). The accessibility of perceptual details represents a plausi-
ble mechanism underlying preserved recent memory, given that
SD patients demonstrate an intact capacity to retrieve sensory-
perceptual details during recent, but not remote, ABM retrieval
(Irish et al., 2011a), and have been shown to perform normally on
sensory-perceptual processing tasks, at least, when feature ambi-
guity is low (Barense et al., 2010). Critically, the salience of ABMs
in SD following the provision of such non-verbal cues speaks to
the nature of the interdependence between semantic memory and
ABM. When SD patients attempt to retrieve a remote event dur-
ing traditional verbally loaded ABM tasks, their ability to access
relevant perceptual details is hampered by their severe semantic
impairment, with the ABM search terminating at the level of non-
specific episodes or repeated events in the ABM system (Conway,
2001). Evidence from the domain of ABM therefore underscores
the proposition that semantic memories form the basic foun-
dation necessary for retrieval of complex and detailed episodic
memories (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010). Of note, the Serial-
Parallel-Independent (SPI) model proposed by Tulving (1995)
has long held that information first enters episodic memory via
semantic memory. This model resonates with our view empha-
sizing the interdependence between these memory systems, and
accords with studies demonstrating that impairment in the seman-
tic framework adversely affects the acquisition of new episodic
memories in the verbal modality (Ween et al., 1996; Graham et al.,
2000). In concert with the progressive deterioration of seman-
tic memory in SD, we see the gradual erosion of episodic ABMs
(Maguire et al., 2010a). Collectively, these findings reinforce the
view that ABMs necessarily contain, and may critically rely upon,
abstracted, supramodal representations of perceptual experiences,
which in turn support the sophisticated act of self-projection back-
wards in time to remember the past (Binder and Desai, 2011; Irish
et al., 2012c).
The evidence reviewed here indicates that semantic concepts
form an integral component of episodic autobiographical mem-
ories, and accords with the conceptualization of autobiographical
and semantic memory as opposite ends of a contextual con-
tinuum (Kihlstrom, 1984; Burianova et al., 2010). Despite well
documented differences in specificity, emotional valence, and con-
textual detail between these memory types, it is apparent that ABM
retrieval relies heavily upon the integrity of semantic information,
with the converse observation that semantic memory relies on
contextual and episodic components also holding true (Gilboa,
2004; Burianova et al., 2010). Thus, evidence from the study of
neurodegenerative conditions serves to reinforce the view that
the retrieval of autobiographical memories invariably involves a
“synergy between semantic memory and contextual information”
(Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010, p. 749).
IMAGINING THE FUTURE – FUTURE ORIENTED THOUGHT
The arena of future oriented thought has undergone a dramatic
surge of research activity within the last few years, with growing
evidence in favor of a link between remembering the past, imag-
ining the future, and engaging in mental simulation processes
(Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Hassabis et al.,
2007; Schacter et al., 2012). The capacity to imagine specific events
in the future has been shown to rely on a number of important
component processes including the retrieval of sensory-perceptual
episodic details, specificity, fluency, and phenomenological ele-
ments such as introspective processes, and the apprehension of
subjective time (D’Argembeau et al., 2010). Two prominent theo-
ries have been proposed regarding the process by which humans
engage in imagining future events. The scene construction hypoth-
esis contends that the capacity to mentally generate and maintain
a complex scene within a coherent spatial context represents a
critical process which underpins a wide range of constructive
processes, such as remembering the past, imagining the future,
as well as atemporal and hypothetical simulation (Hassabis and
Maguire, 2007, 2009). In contrast, the constructive episodic sim-
ulation hypothesis (Schacter and Addis, 2007a,b) holds that the
extraction of episodic details from past memories, and their flex-
ible recombination, is fundamental to the successful generation
of novel future scenarios. Notably, the discovery that the capacity
to envisage future events relies on the same neural machinery as
retrieval of autobiographical events from the past (Addis et al.,
2007; Szpunar et al., 2007; reviewed by Verfaellie et al., 2012) has
proved influential in the resulting conceptualization of future ori-
ented thought. Demonstrations of comparable activity across past
and future conditions in the medial temporal lobes, anteromedial
prefrontal cortices, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex,
lateral parietal and temporal areas has led to the hypothesis that a
common “core” network underlies these capacities (Schacter et al.,
2007, 2012; see Figure 1). In turn, the largely overlapping neuro-
biological substrates of past and future modes of thinking have
led to the proposition that the capacity to mentally project one-
self forward in subjective time is intimately linked to the ability to
remember the past (Addis et al., 2007). Unsurprisingly, a sizeable
proportion of studies have focused on the episodic component of
future oriented thought, with the effects evident even down to the
nomenclature of this construct (“episodic future thinking,”Atance
and O’Neill, 2001; Klein, 2013) although an episodic-semantic
neutral conceptualization has recently been proposed (Stocker,
2012). Under the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, a
fundamental feature of the episodic memory system is its inher-
ent constructive flexibility, which permits the creation of novel
events not previously experienced (Schacter and Addis, 2007a,b).
Damage to the episodic memory system, therefore, is expected to
preclude the ability to mentally simulate future events.
PARALLEL DEFICITS ACROSS PAST AND FUTURE CONTEXTS
IN ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
The detection of equivalent deficits across past and future condi-
tions in a range of clinical conditions, including AD (Addis et al.,
2009), Mild Cognitive Impairment (Gamboz et al., 2010), schiz-
ophrenia (D’Argembeau et al., 2008), and depression (Williams
et al., 1996) has strengthened the putative relationship between
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autobiographical retrieval of the past and simulation of future
events. In the study by Addis et al. (2009), patients with AD were
found to exhibit marked difficulties in envisaging future events.
Importantly these future thinking deficits correlated strongly with
retrieval of past events. A recent study investigated the neural cor-
relates of future thinking dysfunction in AD using voxel-based
morphometry of structural MRI scans, and corroborated the close
correspondence between episodic memory deficits and a compro-
mised capacity for future thinking (Irish et al., 2012a). Crucially,
parallel deficits across past and future contexts in AD were asso-
ciated with disruption to key nodes of the core ABM network,
notably the posterior cingulate cortex and the frontal poles. It
seems likely that episodic memory dysfunction largely underpins
the gross deficits exhibited by AD patients when they are attempt-
ing to envision their personal future. Accordingly, AD patients
may rely on accessible abstracted semantic representations during
future simulation, resulting in gist-based and overgeneral con-
structions. One area that remains underexplored to date concerns
the potential role of scene construction processes as a contrib-
utory factor in future thinking dysfunction in AD. Irish et al.
(2012a) documented that atrophy in the posterior cingulate cor-
tex, and posterior parahippocampal gyrus correlated significantly
with future thinking dysfunction in AD, regions which have been
strongly implicated in the construction of spatially integrated
scenes (Hassabis et al., 2007). Given the neural regions impli-
cated in future thinking deficits in AD, it is therefore reasonable to
assume that scene construction abilities will also be compromised
in these patients. Thus, it remains unclear whether the prominent
future thinking deficits observed in AD correspond to an impaired
capacity for past retrieval, or difficulties with the construction of
spatially coherent scenes, or perhaps, more likely, a confluence of
multiple deficits arising from widespread neuronal damage to the
core network.
THE ARRIVAL OF SEMANTIC MEMORY TO THE FUTURE
THINKING LITERATURE
Greenberg and Verfaellie’s (2010, p. 750) observation that “seman-
tic memories are the basic material from which complex and
detailed episodic memories are constructed” seems remarkably
fitting when considered in relation to future oriented thinking.
Research within the field of future thinking, however, has tended
to eschew the possible contribution of semantic memory in favor
of focusing on how future thinking may relate to the integrity
of the episodic memory system (Klein, 2013). An early study of
mental time travel in patient D.B. (Klein et al., 2002) served to
reinforce the classic distinction between dissociable systems medi-
ating episodic and semantic past and future thinking. Patient
D.B. displayed profound deficits in his recollection of personal
events from his past (episodic memory), which, in turn, impinged
on his ability to project himself into the future. By contrast,
D.B.’s semantic memory was largely preserved, enabling him to
remember and to simulate events within the public, non-personal
(semantic) domain (Klein et al., 2002). These findings served to
reinforce previous views on the dissociation between episodic and
semantic memory systems, and pointed toward distinct tempo-
ral divisions between what Klein (2013) termed “lived time” for
the re-experiencing of the personal past, versus a “known time”
in which semantic knowledge is drawn upon to enable temporal
projection to the impersonal past.
Up until recently, the traditional heuristic of treating episodic
and semantic memory as dissociable systems persisted into the
future thinking domain. Klein (2013, p. 66) notes that as the rela-
tionship between episodic memory and future orientated thought
has strengthened, researchers “simply may have overlooked the
possibility that different types of memory contribute to future
oriented temporal experience.” A number of anomalies emerged
within the literature, whereby experimental findings could not be
adequately subsumed under models that exclusively emphasized
the role of episodic memory in future oriented thought. In an fMRI
study of past and future oriented thinking in personal (episodic)
and non-personal (semantic) domains, Abraham et al. (2008b)
reported functional dissociations between past and future, and
between personal versus non-personal conditions. Importantly,
significant engagement of semantic regions, including the infe-
rior temporal gyrus and temporal poles, was observed irrespective
of temporality or self-referential condition. Most notable is the
observation that patients with developmental amnesia, as a con-
sequence of hippocampal damage, displayed in some instances a
preserved capacity to construct future experiences (Maguire et al.,
2010b; Hurley et al., 2011; Mullally et al., 2012). Explanations for
this relative preservation of future thinking abilities included the
possibility that such patients could harness residual hippocampal
function to support future projection (Maguire et al., 2010b; Mul-
lally et al., 2012), but also the suggestion that semantic knowledge
is an important facet of such imagined scenarios (Cooper et al.,
2011; Hurley et al., 2011).
A COMPROMISED CAPACITY FOR FUTURE THINKING IN
SEMANTIC DEMENTIA
While previous studies pointed to the possible contribution of
semantic memory for future oriented thought, the first empirical
demonstration that both episodic and semantic memory systems
need to be functional to facilitate future thinking has emerged only
recently. Duval et al. (2012) investigated the ability of patients
with SD to form self-representations across past, present, and
future contexts. While patients with SD demonstrated an intact
capacity to retrieve recent self-representations, a striking impair-
ment was observed when these patients envisaged their possible
future selves. This deficit manifested in a marked inability to con-
struct future self-images or to provide relevant contextual details
to support their conception of their future selves (Duval et al.,
2012). The authors concluded that personal semantic informa-
tion therefore makes an important contribution to future oriented
self-projection.
The asymmetric impairment of future with respect to past
oriented thought was corroborated by another study that expli-
cated the neural underpinnings of episodic and semantic future
thinking impairments in SD (Irish et al., 2012a). Participants were
required to remember three spatiotemporally specific events from
the preceding year, and were asked to envisage three novel future
events that might occur within the next year. Using the AI scoring
procedure, a marked incapacity for future simulation was found
in SD, despite their relatively intact retrieval of recent episodic
events. Voxel-based morphometry analyses revealed that these
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striking future thinking deficits in SD robustly correlated with
brain regions known to underpin semantic representations (Visser
et al., 2010), namely the left anterior inferior temporal gyrus and
the bilateral temporal poles (Irish et al., 2012a; see Figure 3). Cru-
cially, these results suggest that the retrieval of past episodes alone
is not sufficient for the successful simulation of future events (see
also Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Andelman et al., 2010) and that
regions beyond the classic episodic memory system are implicated
in complex cognitive endeavors of this kind (Binder et al., 2009;
Irish et al., 2012c).
DIFFERENTIAL DISRUPTION OF CONTEXTUAL DETAILS
DURING FUTURE THINKING IN SD
The specific vulnerability of future simulation in SD is noteworthy
as it speaks to the complexity of this cognitive construct. Further,
the findings from the SD literature challenge the prevailing view of
future simulation, which to date has focused primarily on the role
of the medial temporal lobe and episodic memory (Schacter and
Addis, 2007a,b; Race et al., 2011). Given the relative preservation of
recent episodic memory in SD, and the profound deficits observed
when these patients attempt to envisage their futures, it has been
suggested that certain types of details may be differentially dis-
rupted as the patient attempts to move from past to future contexts
(Irish et al., 2012a). While much of the research impetus to date has
focused on the relationship between episodic memory and future
simulation, the extent to which the content of imagined future
scenarios reflects elements of episodic memories remains unclear
(Szpunar, 2010a). A recent analysis of the types of contextual
details reported during future simulation in SD has offered impor-
tant insights into the component processes underlying the capacity
for future oriented thought. Irish et al. (2012b) dissected the types
of contextual details embedded within past and future narratives
using the AI scoring protocol, and investigated the profiles of con-
textual details for internal (episodic) and external (non-episodic)
subscales. The fine-grained analysis of contextual details in SD
has previously pointed to the disruption of recent spatiotemporal
and emotional internal details during autobiographical retrieval
(Irish et al., 2011a), whereas external details have been shown to be
uniquely elevated in this group (McKinnon et al., 2008). Impor-
tantly, Irish et al. (2012b) reported that SD patients’ generation
of internal event details (i.e., those details conveying the crux of
the episode) showed an asymmetric profile (past> future effect),
whereby recent past retrieval was within Control levels yet such
details were profoundly impaired exclusively in the future condi-
tion. In contrast, SD patients demonstrated a future> past effect
for external event details, that is, those details which are believed to
reflect non-episodic, or semantic, information (Irish et al., 2012b).
The asymmetric decline of internal, and concurrent elevation
of external, details during future simulation in SD mirrors that
previously demonstrated in healthy aging for retrieval of past auto-
biographical memories (Levine et al., 2002), and simulation of
future events (Gaesser et al., 2011) albeit to an exaggerated degree.
Of significance here, however, is the observation that while inter-
nal event details can be readily extracted from the past in SD, and
remain available during the process of simulation, the construc-
tion of a future event ultimately fails. This finding underscores
previous observations that thinking about the future necessarily
draws upon contributions from both episodic and semantic mem-
ory (D’Argembeau and Mathy, 2011; Klein, 2013). In parallel with
the failure to utilize readily available episodic details from the
past, is the observation that SD patients produce a preponderance
of off-target information not directly relevant to the event being
simulated. At first glance, the over-production of non-episodic
content in a cohort typified by marked semantic deficits seems
counterintuitive, however, Irish et al. (2012b) note that such exter-
nal details, in fact, represent off-target retrieval from unrelated
past episodes. Thus the information provided by the SD patients
is largely episodic, albeit unrelated to the event being simulated.
These recent findings are important as they resonate with a
review article which questioned whether the strict reliance on the
FIGURE 3 | Deficits in future thinking in semantic dementia are exclusively associated with gray matter intensity decrease in the left anterior
temporal lobe, as revealed by voxel-based morphometry analyses. Clusters are significant at P < 0.001 and overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute
standard brain. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. **P <0.0001; n/s, not significant. Figure adapted from Irish et al. (2012a).
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contents of episodic memory represents the most efficient route to
construct future scenarios (Szpunar, 2010a). By this view, Szpunar
(2010a) reasons that the contribution of episodic and semantic ele-
ments during future simulation will invariably depend upon the
accessibility of information that is relevant to the event of inter-
est. Crucially, the content of any future simulation will reflect the
information that is most readily accessible (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1982; Szpunar, 2010a,b). Healthy individuals are likely to draw
upon abstracted representations and such representations should,
in general, be more accessible than specific one-off episodic rep-
resentations (Szpunar, 2010a). In contrast, certain scenarios may
exist in which episodic representations of specific events may rep-
resent the most efficient mode for future thinking. If we consider
the findings from the SD patients in the Irish et al. (2012a,b) series,
it becomes evident that the information most accessible to these
patients is that of unique recent episodic occurrences and more
general repeated events or “repisodes” in the absence of general
conceptual semantic knowledge.
THE SEMANTIC SCAFFOLDING HYPOTHESIS
If episodic details represent the most accessible and efficient means
for SD patients to construct a future scenario, why then are these
details so vulnerable during future simulation? In line with cur-
rent views emphasizing the importance of episodic and semantic
contributions during future thinking, the findings from SD studies
offer compelling evidence that the disintegration of the concep-
tual knowledge base adversely affects the ability to construct events
in the future (Irish et al., 2012a). In this light, the recently pro-
posed semantic scaffolding hypothesis is particularly pertinent,
whereby semantic knowledge appears to provide a framework
or scaffolding which facilitates past retrieval and future think-
ing (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010; Irish et al., 2012a). This
semantic scaffolding hypothesis is relevant to the finding that
a loss of semantic knowledge precludes the ability to simulate
novel future events. In SD, the successful extraction of sensory-
perceptual details from recent events occurs in the absence of the
necessary conceptual framework to impart overall structure to
the scenario (Irish et al., 2012b). If extraction of episodic details
from the past represents the building blocks of future simulations,
any attempt to construct a coherent scenario without the neces-
sary scaffold or framework, results in the provision of a series of
unrelated mini-events. Essentially, the episodic details cannot be
integrated within the appropriate schema or abstracted represen-
tation from semantic memory. One further issue to disentangle,
in this regard, is at which point in the simulation process seman-
tic memory becomes pivotal? SD patients may not possess the
relevant abstracted semantic representations to facilitate the con-
struction of future events; however, a second possibility is that
the loss of conceptual knowledge in SD also adversely impacts on
the integrative mechanism necessary to bind episodic details into a
coherent simulation. The final product of a successful future simu-
lation likely comprises elements of various episodic and semantic
details that are flexibly recombined to create an integrated and
coherent representation of a specific future event (Szpunar, 2010a;
Addis et al., 2011). It remains unknown, however, whether the
amodal loss of semantic knowledge in SD precludes the recombi-
nation of episodic details from past retrieval into a coherent novel
scenario, although this proposal represents an intriguing and plau-
sible explanation for the elevation of unrelated event details in this
group (Irish et al., 2012b). Further work is necessary to elucidate
the precise mechanisms of detail recombination and, specifically,
whether the reconfiguring of past details entails some form of
semantic associative processing. It is possible that recombination
may reflect a two-step process, in which firstly semantic associa-
tions between disparate details are made, drawing on abstracted
representations that are accessible contingent on the specific task
requirements, following which a process of integrative binding
is required to flexibly recombine these details together into a
coherent spatiotemporal framework. Determining the precise con-
stituent elements of recombination within semantic frameworks
represents an important line of enquiry for future research.
SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE AND NOVELTY OF FUTURE
SIMULATIONS
Semantic memory may be particularly important for the simu-
lation of novel future events, in which no prior experience can
be drawn upon from episodic memory. By its nature, seman-
tic memory can be generalized to many different contexts (Mion
et al., 2010), thus providing undifferentiated conceptual informa-
tion that can be drawn upon to facilitate novel event construction
(Binder and Desai, 2011; Irish et al., 2012a). The novelty of the
simulated event becomes of paramount importance when we con-
sider the profound difficulties experienced by patients with SD in
envisioning events that have not occurred previously. Irish et al.
(2012a) found that 80% of future events described by SD patients
represented events that had been previously experienced in their
entirety. Simply put, the SD patients demonstrated a marked
propensity to sample past episodes and to recapitulate these events
into the future condition, despite explicit task instructions requir-
ing them to generate novel events not previously experienced.
The severe semantic impairment in SD, therefore, disrupts the
capacity for novel event generation, manifesting in scenarios that
have been recast from intact past memories (Irish et al., 2012b).
Recasting of the past is an intriguing phenomenon in SD, and
suggests that the construction of novel events critically relies on
the harnessing and deployment of semantic knowledge. By this
argument, events which occur within familiar and repeated spa-
tiotemporal contexts may be more readily accessible in SD, as the
patients can successfully retrieve prior instances within such famil-
iar contexts (Graham et al., 1999; Irish et al., 2011a). It may be
that the envisaging of novel scenarios, for which one has little
to no prior episodic experience, heavily taxes the semantic mem-
ory system, requiring the individual to draw on general world
knowledge to guide them in their constructive endeavor. In SD,
however, the progressive deterioration of the semantic memory
system renders such conceptual knowledge inaccessible, causing
the patient to overly rely on previously encountered scenarios,
and ultimately resulting in the recapitulation of past events into
the future condition.
It has recently been suggested that the creation of a suitable“sit-
uation model” represents a crucial process to facilitate the retrieval
of past, and simulation of future, events (Ranganath and Ritchey,
2012). The successful formation of a situation model is, in turn,
posited to depend on the integrity of a posterior medial cortical
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 27 | 8
Irish and Piguet Semantic contributions to episodic memory
system centered on the posterior parahippocampal cortex and
retrosplenial cortex (Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012). This view cor-
roborates previous fMRI studies of healthy individuals engaging
in future simulation, in which the importance of posterior regions
including the posterior cingulate cortex and parahippocampal
cortex in the activation of well-known contextual settings has
been emphasized (Szpunar et al., 2009). Notably, posterior brain
regions remain relatively preserved until later in SD. These pos-
terior regions offer a potential neuroanatomical signature for the
harnessing of familiar contexts effect that is reliably demonstrated
in future thinking studies in SD. Accordingly, SD patients draw
upon the accessible situation model but cannot integrate or update
this model to create a novel scenario, and inevitably recapitulate
overgeneral or previously experienced events during future sim-
ulation. Further exploration of this recasting of familiar contexts
effect in SD is clearly warranted, in particular how this phenome-
non is related to the observation of an intact capacity to generate
“repisodes” (Neisser, 1981) during ABM retrieval (Greenberg and
Verfaellie, 2010). Likewise, an obvious outstanding area of research
relates to whether the amodal loss of semantic knowledge in SD
precludes the construction of spatially coherent scenes, in line with
the scene construction theory advanced by Hassabis and Maguire
(2007) and Hassabis et al. (2007). Unraveling the contribution of
semantic memory to scene construction processes will be essential
in clarifying the precise role of conceptual knowledge in memory
and imagination.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude this review at an exciting juncture in episodic mem-
ory research. What has become evident is the incontrovertible
extent to which episodic and semantic memory interact during
complex forms of past and future oriented thinking, and the
limitations of couching such endeavors within the traditional tax-
onomy of episodic and semantic memory as dissociable systems.
The studying of complex cognitive processes in neurodegenerative
conditions has proved critical for explicating how episodic and
semantic elements may work in concert during autobiographical
retrieval and future simulation, yet much remains to be elucidated.
We suggest that concerted efforts are warranted to disentangle and
elucidate the precise contributions of each memory system to con-
structive recollective and simulative endeavors, which in turn will
illuminate our understanding of the episodic memory system of
the brain.
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